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Leveraging Domestic Law Against Cyberattacks
Justin Malzac*

“It is almost impossible to overstate the gap between the rate at which the cybersecurity threat is
getting worse relative to our ability to effectively address it. The simple fact of the matter is that
no nation has yet found an effective solution to stop foreign malevolent cyber activity. We will
continue to be confronted by this challenge in 2020.”
Glenn Gerstell, General Counsel for the National Security Agency1

INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, cyberspace has become a key area of operations, for both
criminals and states alike, as they pursue their particular interests internationally. The United
States has been struggling to adapt to this new paradigm, as have most democratic countries
across the globe. Most recently, malicious cyber actors have been targeting medical systems
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Glenn Gerstell, NSA General Counsel Remarks to the American Bar Association, LAWFARE (Jan. 17, 2020, 10:00
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/nsa-general-counsel-remarks-american-bar-association.
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during the COVID epidemic.2 As highlighted in May of this year by Adina Ponta, “Recent
reports and Interpol warnings show a surge in low-level cyber operations during the ongoing
pandemic against hospitals, clinics and pharmaceutical companies.”3 Cyber criminals continue to
grow more sophisticated and more prolific.
In March of this year, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, established by the Fiscal
Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, released its full report to Congress.4 While the
report presents many innovations in cyber defense, it suffers from one significant weakness—a
fixation on a cyber doomsday scenario that has yet to occur. In the executive summary, the
authors argue “During the Cold War, our best minds were tasked with developing Continuity of
Government plans to ensure that the government could survive and the nation recover after a
nuclear strike. We need similar planning today to ensure that we can reconstitute in the aftermath of a national-level cyberattack.”5 While referencing nuclear war in a cyber debate makes
for a good political show, it bears little connection to reality. Such doomsday scenarios have
played out numerous times on the silver screen, but not a single one has yet occurred in real life
and the possibility remains unlikely.6 The majority of attacks that have made headlines in the

2

See, e.g., Chris Fox & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus: Russian Spies Target Covid-19 Vaccine Research, BBC NEWS
(Jul. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53429506 (detailing a recent cyberattack on a Covid-19
research lab).
3
Adina Ponta, Cyber Operations Against Medical Facilities During Peacetime, LAWFARE (May 1, 2020, 10:33
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-operations-against-medical-facilities-during-peacetime. Ponta also notes
here that such attacks “mostly consist in spreading false information about cures, prevention measures, and stocks of
medical supplies,” or in seizing personal data for the sake of blackmail. See also id.
4
CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION, U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION FULL REPORT (2020),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ryMCIL_dZ30QyjFqFkkf10MxIXJGT4yv/view.
5
Senator Angus King & Representative Mike Gallagher, Chairmen’s Letter to U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM
COMMISSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ii (2020),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c1UQI74Js6vkfjUowI598NjwaHD1YtlY/view.
6
See Lee Jarvis & Stuart Macdonald, Responding to Cyberterrorism: Options and Avenues, 16 GEO. J. INT’L AFF.
134, 139 (2015) (“[I]t seems reasonable to suggest that doomsday scenarios around cyberterrorism may be located
somewhere between misguided and unlikely.”).
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past decade have targeted personal information, not infrastructure.7 Even the Stuxnet worm,
which targeted and damaged centrifuges connected to the Iranian nuclear program, only caused
around $2 million worth of damage.8 Moreover, it caused little to no civil disruption, and Iran
was able to recover from the physical damage within months, even while under sanctions.9 Most
recently, the so-called "hack of the decade" by suspected Russian agents against U.S.
government systems, which hit the news last December, represented relatively benign
behavior—foreign agents only accessed unclassified government networks and caused no
physical damage in the process.10
The government certainly must prepare for a catastrophic cyber event, but should
prioritize efforts to defend against the smaller attacks that happen on a daily basis, and are
primarily directed against private industry. NASA works to defend us against a statistically
unlikely asteroid collision, but they spend much more time and money on realistic and attainable
goals, such as sending astronauts to low orbit and unmanned craft to nearby planets.11 Malicious
cyberattacks happen every day, and they overwhelmingly target private entities, not the

7

See, e.g., Catalin Cimpanu, A Decade of Hacking: The Most Notable Cyber Security Events of the 2010s, ZDNET
(Dec. 12, 2019, 10:52 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-decade-of-hacking-the-most-notable-cyber-securityevents-of-the-2010s/ (summarizing noteworthy cyberattacks of the 2010s).
8
Jarvis & Macdonald, supra note 6, at 138-39.
9
See Joby Warrick, Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility Recovered Quickly from Stuxnet Cyberattack, WASH. POST (Feb.
15, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans-natanz-nuclear-facility-recovered-quickly-from-stuxnetcyber-attack/2011/02/15/ABUIkoQ_story.html.
10
See Kimberly Dozier, U.S. Cyber Experts Scramble to Assess the Scope of the 'Hack of a Decade', TIME (Dec. 18,
2020), https://time.com/5923056/cyber-attack-us-government/ (While certainly harmful to U.S. national security and
representative of the general threat of cyberattacks, this "worst-ever" incident, as some have called it, was far from
the apocalyptic scenarios requiring the "reconstitution" of government and society still being pushed today in
government reports such as that of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Lost in the hyperbolic news-cycle was the
fact that this attack affected private industry as much, or even more, than the government.)
11
See NASA, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION FY 2020 SPENDING PLAN FOR APPROPRIATION
2 (May 28, 2020), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fy_2020_spend_plan.pdf (reporting $150M
earmarked for planetary defense out of the total $22.7B NASA 2020 spending plan).

3

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

government and its information or infrastructure.12 According to Norton, “Cybercriminals will
steal an estimated 33 billion records in 2023.” 13 In 2019, Cyber Defense Magazine noted that
“43% of all cyberattacks are aimed at small businesses.”14 Bringing those harrowing statistics
home, Norton also suggested there is an expectation for “more than half of all data breaches
globally to occur in the United States by 2023.”15 Many of these small companies without their
own internal capacity to defend themselves.16
In recent years there have been several high-profile cyber incidents tied to states,
including the hacking of Sony Pictures by North Korea in 2014, and the election manipulation
campaign and hacking of computer networks controlled by the Democratic National Committee
by Russia-tied groups in 2016.17 Many of these incidents, though clearly attributed to states, fell
below the threshold of an “armed attack” per the UN Charter, preventing a lawful self-defense
response by the government.18 Indeed, most cyberattacks fall below this threshold, creating
ambiguity for the legal responses victim states may take.19 The need to respond to such largescale attacks should not be skirted, but it also should not be the sole, or even primary focus of
national cyber policy.

12

See Nick Galov, Cyber Security Statistics for 2019, CYBER DEF. MAG. (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/cyber-security-statistics-for-2019/ (detailing the effects of cybercrime on
businesses).
13
10 Cyber Security Facts and Statistics for 2018, NORTON (2018), https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-emergingthreats-10-facts-about-todays-cybersecurity-landscape-that-you-should-know.html.
14
Galov, supra note 12.
15
NORTON, supra note 12.
16
See Galov, supra note 12 (“Many small businesses have minimal security infrastructure, making them easy prey
for data predators.”).
17
For details on the indictment of Russian agents for the DNC hack, see, e.g., Alex Ward, Read: Mueller Indictment
Against 12 Russian Spies for DNC Hack, VOX (Jul. 13, 2018, 12:30 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/7/13/17568806/mueller-russia-intelligence-indictment-full-text (detailing the indictment
of Russian agents for the DNC hack).
18
See Ryan Goodman, Cyber Operations and the U.S. Definition of “Armed Attack”, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53495/cyber-operations-u-s-definition-armed-attack/.
19
See generally id. (describing inconsistencies in different countries’ responses to cyberattacks); see also Galov,
supra note 12 (“In 2017, 61% of data breach victims were companies with less than 1000 employees.”).
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As noted above, the vast majority of cyberattacks fall on small, private enterprises, not
on government infrastructure. This reality requires civil and domestic responses, rather than
military ones. Even so, the United States government is still fixated on big government, if not
military-led responses to cyberattacks.20 As shown recently by Jason Healy, “federal
cybersecurity spending on civilian departments like the departments of Homeland Security,
State, Treasury, and Justice is overshadowed by that going toward the military.”21 Indeed, as
Healy noted, “The White House and National Cyber Strategy emphasize the need to protect the
American people and our way of life, yet the budget does not reflect those values. Rather, the
budget clearly shows that the Defense Department is the government’s main priority.”22
The current buzzword in cyber politics is “Defend Forward,” first presented in the 2018
Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, the DOD’s subordinate document to the National Cyber
Strategy.23 The unclassified introduction to the plan argues that the DOD’s “primary role in this
homeland defense mission is to defend forward by leveraging our focus outward to stop threats
before they reach their targets.”24 This involves using military cyber means to monitor, disrupt,
or even counterattack malicious cyber actors.25 What was originally designed as a strictly
military plan, focusing on the United States’ “most capable and dangerous adversaries in

20

See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 1 (Sep. 18, 2018),
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF
[hereinafter SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 1].
21
Jason Healey, The Cyber Budget Shows What the U.S. Values—And It Isn’t Defense, LAWFARE (Jun. 1, 2020,
11:21 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-budget-shows-what-us-values%E2%80%94and-it-isnt-defense.
22
Id.
23
SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 1, supra note 20.
24
Id. at 2.
25
Id.
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cyberspace” and leaving the “lesser threats” to civil authorities, has since been adopted by the
Cyberspace Solarium Commission into its domestic agenda.26
In a speech to the American Bar Association this past January, Glenn Gerstell, General
Counsel for the NSA, painted a grave picture for the coming years in regards to the cyber threat
faced by the United States, ultimately concluding in part that “these challenges will present a
series of policy choices, and those in turn will require new laws or amendments to existing
laws.”27 Action must be taken. As the Cyberspace Solarium Commission chairmen pointed out,
“Today most cyber actors feel undeterred, if not emboldened, to target our personal data and
public infrastructure.”28 The question is not whether the United States should respond to
cyberattacks and cybercrime, but how to respond and who should be in the lead.
This paper is a response to recent U.S. government policy developments and is
constructed in two parts. First is an examination of how international law has been largely unable
to tackle the growing cyber epidemic.29 Domestic measures are necessary because of the lack of
enforceable international law norms, the weakness of international law responses, and the
challenged posed by near-peer competitor states that are employing domestic measures of their
own. The second part consolidates a range of domestic policy options as a means of defense
against increasing cyber aggression below the threshold of war and as a counter proposal to the
big government-centric options currently being touted in front of Congress.30
Ultimately, as the number of cyberattacks against the United States—both by state and
non-state actors—continues to swell, swift action must be taken. And since international law has
26

Jeff Kosseff, The Contours of ‘Defend Forward’ Under International Law, in 2019 11TH INT’L CONF. ON CYBER
CONFLICT: SILENT BATTLE 307, 310 (T. Minárek et al. eds., 2019),
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/CyCon_2019_BOOK.pdf.
27
Gerstell, supra note 1.
28
King & Gallagher, supra note 5, at i.
29
See infra Part I.
30
See infra Part II.
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largely failed to address the epidemic, we must rely on domestic means of defense, but the
question still stands as to which types of measures will be most effective. This paper argues that
the best way to address the rash of smaller, localized cyberattacks is to empower attribution
mechanisms such as private cyber security (“hack back”) and passive military posturing (“defend
forward”) in order to support actions in domestic U.S. courts (criminal prosecution and civil
liability). Contrary to recent proposals, big government is not the answer. The only feasible
approach to combat thousands of daily cyberattacks is a decentralized one.
I.

THE INADEQUACIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
It has been widely accepted for some time that a cyber operation meeting the recognized

definition of an “armed attack”—such as a cyberattack which causes physical damage or deaths
at the affected site—is governed by the same international law which regulates kinetic attack
(i.e., jus ad bellum or jus in bello).31 However, decades on, there is still little consensus on what,
if any, elements of international law govern cyber operations or intrusions below the threshold of
armed attack.32 The lack of consensus on cyber and sovereignty has been reiterated by scholars
such as Harriet Moynihan, who wrote in 2019 that “to date most States have not put on record
their views, and as yet, the matter is not clear or settled.”33 The current discussion on sovereignty
is highly “western-centric,” with Russia and China voicing contrary interpretations in recent

31

See generally Eitan Diamond, Applying International Humanitarian Law to Cyber Warfare, in LAW & NAT’L
SECURITY: SELECTED ISSUES 67 (Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Anat Kurz eds., 2014) (comparing and contrasting the
application of IHL to cyberattacks). See also Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as
Prepared for Delivery by Harold Hongju Koh to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference Ft. Meade,
MD, Sept. 18, 2012, 54 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 7 (2012) (discussing the enduring U.S. government perspective).
32
See Goodman, supra note 18 (contrasting the U.S. and international approaches to self-defense in response to low
level cyberattacks).
33
Harriet Moynihan, The Application of International Law to Cyberspace: Sovereignty and Non-intervention, JUST
SECURITY (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/67723/the-application-of-international-law-to-cyberspacesovereignty-and-non-intervention/.
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meetings of the UN Group of Experts for cyber.34 Even U.S. experts have voiced their doubts.
For example, Gary Corn, the former Staff Judge Advocate at U.S. Cyber Command, has noted,
“the fact that States have developed vastly different regimes to govern the air, space, and
maritime domains underscores the fallacy of a universal rule of sovereignty with a clear
application to the domain of cyberspace.”35 Most, if not all, recent cyber incidents have fallen
well below the threshold of war, and under the purview of peacetime international law.36
However, the mechanisms of the peacetime regime have thus far been inadequate to stem, or
even largely respond to these attacks.
The power and authority of international law comes from a consensus of views, actions,
and recognized legal norms.37 When the international community stands apart, gaps appear in the
legal bulwark that can be exploited by opportunist or maleficent actors.38 For example, despite
overt international support for UN sanctions against North Korea, that country has been able to
maintain its nuclear and military programs in part because China and other countries have
violated trade restrictions.39 International law is largely inadequate in addressing malicious cyber

34

Id.
Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 207, 210 (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.57.
36
See Goodman, supra note 18 (discussing the legal and factual ambiguities surrounding state use of cyber tactics).
See also Galov, supra note 12 (detailing 2019 cyberattack statistics).
37
See Bruce Cronin, International Legal Consensus and the Control of Excess State Violence, 11 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 311, 311 (2005) (Current dominant theories on international law focus on state consent as the basis of
customary law. Cronin argues that a new regime of “consensus-based” law has emerged, largely following WWII.
He differentiates traditional customary law from consensus-based law by suggesting that the former is established
only after years of consistent state practice, whereas the latter is created to preempt unwanted practice. In the case of
cyber law, the many international working groups such as the GGE or OEWG are often concerned with large-effect
cyber questions that have yet to manifest in enduring state practice. This aligns these efforts with Cronin’s definition
of consensus-based international law.).
38
See Stewart M. Patrick, Is the International Community Growing Part?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Feb. 4,
2013), https://www.cfr.org/blog/international-community-growing-apart (arguing that a lack of international unity
has prevented an effective global response to cybercrime).
39
See, e.g., Michelle Nichols, Exclusive: North Korea Enhanced Nuclear, Missile Programs in 2019 in Breach of
Sanctions, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2020, 1:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-sanctions-unexclusive/exclusive-north-korea-enhanced-nuclear-missile-programs-in-2019-in-breach-of-sanctions-u-n-reportidUSKBN20426J (detailing the DPRK’s use of China to conduct ship-to-ship transfers of coal).
35

8

LEVERAGING DOMESTIC LAW AGAINST CYBERATTACK

activities for several reasons, including the lack of customary law, the weakness of the responses
allowed under international law, and the strengthening of domestic measures by rival states.
A. Customary International Law
The multiple sources of international law are described in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, and include: international conventions (treaties), international
custom (customary law and norms), the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
(opinio juris), and international court decisions which are binding on the parties involved.40
Article 38 also suggests that other judicial decisions, such as those of the International Court of
Justice, and “highly qualified” academic work, such as the Tallinn Manual, may be relied up as
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”41 In the end, though, treaty law is king.
Treaties create clear and binding obligations on the states that join them.42 When treaty
obligations and customary law conflict, treaty will almost always trump custom.43
In absence of any treaty, which is currently true of cyberattacks below the threshold of
armed attack—most states agree that cyberattacks meeting the threshold of an armed attack are
governed by long-established rules for armed conflict, such as the UN Charter and the Geneva
Conventions—customary international law fills the legal void.44 Custom exists when states

40

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
Id. The United States does not strongly support the ICJ and has long rejected ICJ authority. The U.S. withdrew
from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, in response to the Nicaragua Decision, and the Trump
administration has been moving to withdraw from secondary treaties which may provide the court with indirect
means of jurisdiction. Even so, Article 38 lays out the foundations of International Law in a manner that most
American jurists would agree with.
42
See Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary Law Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237,
240 (2016) (“States explicitly consent to be bound by a treaty, but their consent to customary international law (to
the extent it exists) usually must be inferred.”).
43
See id. (“[M]ost tend to presume that, where the two sources require contradictory outcomes, treaty law will
prevail.”).
44
See id. at 246 (“In the absence of directly relevant treaty law, and in need of reliable guiding principles, states are
developing practices standardizing their rights and duties in these new spheres.”).
41
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commonly exhibit a standard of behavior and accept that standard as obligatory.45 Acceptance is
generally determined through the public policy statements or legal interpretation, known as
opinion juris, of the state.46 Customary international law acts in a similar way to treaty law,
requiring a type of state consent, but in the form of state practice or published opinion related to
the issue.47 The establishment of an international norm does not require universal acceptance, but
states that persistently object to an emerging custom are generally not held to it.48
Unfortunately, states have yet to agree on how international law should handle belowthe-threshold cyberattacks. Just within the UN there are two competing processes. One of these,
the Group of Governmental Experts or GGE, is the continuation of an enduring process
championed by the United States. The other, called the Open-Ended Working Group or OEWG,
was recently sponsored by Russia, as that state seeks to redirect and dominate the cyber
discussion to its own ends. Neither of these processes are likely to produce concrete results in the
near future.49
One source offers a glimpse of what that consensus might eventually be like, at least if
Western perspectives win out. This is the Tallinn Manual [hereinafter “the Manual”].50 The first
edition was released in 2013, the second in 2017, and both were collaborative projects sponsored
by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence.51 The second manual, dubbed

45

See Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L.
REV. 565, 642 (2016) (defining the elements of customary international law).
46
See Hiroshi Taki, Opinio Juris and the Formation of Customary International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 51
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 447, 448 (2008) (providing a definition and analysis of “opinio juris”).
47
See Crootof, Change Without Consent, supra note 42, at 240.
48
See Cronin, supra note 37, at 314 (“[S]tates can exempt themselves from customary law by maintaining a
persistent and consistent objection to it over a period of time.”).
49
See Elaine Korzak, What’s Ahead in the Cyber Norms Debate?, LAWFARE (Mar. 16, 2020, 12:08 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-ahead-cyber-norms-debate (arguing that “The fundamental differences and
political divisions that torpedoed the discussions of the 2016-2017 GGE are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon.”).
50
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge
U. Press, 2017); see also Tallinn Manual 2.0, NATO CCDCOE, https://ccdcoe.org/research/tallinn-manual/ (last
visited Aug. 14, 2020) (describing the manual’s history, contributors, and aspirations).
51
Tallinn Manual 2.0, NATO CCDCOE, supra note 50.
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Tallinn Manual 2.0, is now one of the most cited documents relating to cyber law.52 However, it
is important to note that the Manual is not itself customary international law, nor an expression
of state policy.53 In fact, the authors explicitly affirm the opposite, writing the Manual does not
“reflect the position of any other organization or state represented by . . . participation as
[authors] or as peer reviewers by individuals who hold government positions.”54 In the case of
the Tallinn Manual, several of the world’s most active cyber players—Russia, North Korea, Iran,
Cuba—did not participate in the writing of the book.55 As noted by Robert Papp of the Wilson
Center, “The Tallinn Manual could be a starting point [for a future cyber treaty], although the
Russian Federation played no part in its drafting and would want its own input.”56
The authors of the Manual intended to capture the contemporary state of customary
international law related to cyberattacks. However earnest this endeavor was, it is severely
weakened by internal disagreements on the most critical issues (such as sovereignty), the rapidly
changing landscape of published opinio juris, and the distance certain countries (including the
United States) have built between their own policies and the Manual’s “rules.” 57
52

Id.
There are countless examples of academic work which overlook this fact and cite to the Tallinn Manual as though
it were established primary authority. Not only do the authors of the manual disagree on many points among
themselves, but states such as the U.S. have distanced themselves from some of its key rules. Any reference to the
Tallinn Manual should include a caveat that it is not customary legal authority. See, e.g., Ponta, supra note 3 (failing
to clarify the limited authority of the manual).
54
Introduction, in TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 2
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter Introduction, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
55
See, e.g., The Hague Launch of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations
and a Panel Discussion, ASSER INST. (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.asser.nl/media/3515/report-the-hague-launch-ofthe-tallinn-manual-20-on-the-international-law-applicable-to-cyber-operations.pdf (mentioning that the Tallinn
Manual Hague process included some participation from Chinese and Belarusian delegates, but not Russians);
Robert G. Papp, Kennan Cable No. 41: A Cyber Treaty with Russia, WILSON CTR.,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-41-cyber-treaty-russia (last visited Sept. 3, 2020)
(“Given these myriad challenges, what would a cyber treaty with Russia look like? We would need to start with
terms of reference, carefully defined and mutually agreed upon. The ‘Tallinn Manual’ could be a starting point,
although the Russian Federation played no part in its drafting and would want its own input.”).
56
Papp, supra note 55.
57
Brian J. Egan, Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm (conceding that “the Tallinn Manuals will make a
valuable contribution to underscoring and demonstrating [that existing international law applies to State behavior in
53
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Much of the ambiguity regarding international cyber norms lies in states’ interpretation—
at least those which have published opinions on the matter—on how the long held international
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention apply to cyber operations.58 As noted recently by
Gary Corn, “only a handful of states have offered official views on the application of the nonintervention rule in the cyber context, providing little insight into their views of the rule’s
internal content.”59 Representatives from United States and the United Kingdom have both
offered opinions that there is no strict sovereignty rule in regards to cyberspace.60 Rather, the
issue arises with any violation of the principle of non-intervention.61 This principle, described in
the Nicaragua Case, establishes that states are prohibited from coercive intervention in matters
that are the exclusive right of another state (e.g., elections, policing, and other government
matters).62
However, in 2019 the Netherlands offered the opinion “that respect for the sovereignty of
other countries is an obligation in its own right, the violation of which may in turn constitute an
internationally wrongful act.”63 At the same time, the French have gone further, suggesting that

cyberspace] across a number of bodies of international law, even if we do not necessarily agree with every aspect of
the Manuals.”).
58
Introduction, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 54, at 6.
59
Gary Corn, Punching on the Edges of the Grey Zone: Iranian Cyber Threats and State Cyber Responses, JUST
SECURITY (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68622/punching-on-the-edges-of-the-grey-zone-iraniancyber-threats-and-state-cyber-responses/.
60
Egan, supra note 57 (stating “remote cyber operations involving computers or other networked devices located on
another State’s territory do not constitute a per se violation of international law. In other words, there is no absolute
prohibition on such operations,” especially when they have de minimis effects).
61
See, e.g., id.; Jeremy Wright, Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century, GOV.UK (May 23, 2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century.
62
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“any unauthorized penetration” of systems in a state’s territory “via a digital vector may
constitute, at the least, a breach of sovereignty.”64 More recently, the Czech representative to the
OEWG concurred with the idea of “the principle of sovereignty as an independent right and the
respect to sovereignty as an independent obligation,” but provided a limited list of the types of
cyber intrusions which would constitute a violation, disagreeing with the French perspective.65
The United States, for its part, has argued for a de minimis approach, where a certain threshold of
effect must be crossed before the intrusion becomes a wrongful act.66
These are just the views of the traditional western powers. Russia offered the
International Law of the Sea (i.e. UNCLOS) as an analog for cyber rules, with all the territorial
rigidity that entails,67 and Cuba has rejected the well-established right to react to malicious cyber
operations through sanctions and countermeasures.68 As one last bit of evidence showing clearly
the lack of substantial cyber norms today, the DOD General Counsel recently remarked that due
to the “lack of agreement among states on how such rules apply” it is necessary that “DOD
lawyers provide advice guided by how existing rules apply to activities in other domains, while
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considering the unique, and frequently changing, aspects of cyberspace.”69 Military lawyers of
the Unites States, who should know the requirements of international law as well as anyone, are
still providing analysis through analogy.70 It should be a safe prediction that an international
consensus on these, many other cyber-related issues, will not be achieved any time soon.
B. Weakness of International Law Responses
Even if customary norms are established regarding below-the-threshold cyber operations,
states have limited recourses against violations of international law. If the cyber operation meets
the threshold of an “armed attack,” a state is allowed to respond in individual or collective selfdefense, per Article 51 of the UN Charter.71 While the exact conditions when an attack would
breach this threshold are still actively debated, there is a general consensus that any cyberattack
which generates harm or damage equivalent to a kinetic strike would be an armed attack.72
However, the overwhelming majority of cyber operations today do not reach that level.73
States are allowed to take certain measures in response to harm received when other
states fail or violate their international obligations. In general, states are obligated to respond to
international crimes.74 For example, the commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [hereinafter “Draft Articles”], adopted by the UN

69

Paul C. Ney, Jr., DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference, DEP’T OF DEF.
(Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counselremarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/.
70
Id.
71
U.N. Charter art. 51 (stating that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Note that this would
theoretically allow a state to respond in collective self-defense to an attack on another UN Member State, though
that typically involves a request for aid).
72
Sean Watts & Theodore Richard, Baseline Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
771, 793-94 (2018).
73
Id.
74
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 56 GAOR Supp. No. 11, at 75, U.N. Doc A/56/10 (2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles].

14

LEVERAGING DOMESTIC LAW AGAINST CYBERATTACK

General Assembly in 2001, cited the Tellini Case of 1923.75 This case addressed a dispute
between Italy and Greece involving an assassination that occurred on Greek territory.76 The
Special Commission of Jurists ruled a state may be responsible for “the commission in its
territory of a political crime against the persons of foreigners if the state has neglected to take all
reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime and the pursuit, arrest and bringing to justice
of the criminal.”77
In treaty law, there are several examples of agreements which require prosecution of
cybercrimes and cyberattacks. One is the 2001 EU Council Convention on Cybercrime
(Budapest Convention), which has, as of this writing, 65 parties including the United States and
other non-European states such as Japan.78 It is worth noting that Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, and
North Korea are not Contracting States.79 Through the convention, the signatories have agreed to
“ensure that the criminal offences established in accordance with [the Convention] are
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of
liberty.”80 These offenses include: the illegal access or interception of data, the interference with
computer data or systems, the development of devices and software for hacking, and computerrelated fraud or forgery.81 More importantly, the convention clarifies jurisdiction for a state to
include when an offence is committed in its territory, on board one of its flagged ships or
registered aircrafts, or by one of its nationals (a form of extraterritorial jurisdiction).82
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Another set of treaties which require states to take action against criminal acts, including
presumably cyberattacks, are the Chicago and Montreal Aviation Conventions. The latter,
formerly titled the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, includes as offenses when any person “communicates information which he knows to
be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.”83 One could reasonably argue
that sending a virus or other malware to an aircraft computer would constitute communicating
false information.84 Article 3 of this convention requires member states to make the listed
offenses “punishable by severe penalties.”85 These and other treaties require states to take action
against cybercrimes within their respective territories. This, therefore, implicates states who
sanction or condone such operations.
International law allows states to respond to breaches in certain ways. The most
significant of these responses are countermeasures.86 These actions have long been an enduring
aspect of international law, but were implemented in detail in the Draft Articles.87 These actions
are defined in Article 22 of Part I of the Draft Articles, which declares “The wrongfulness of an
act of a state not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is
precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure,” against a state which is
responsible for an internationally wrongful act. 88 Countermeasures are further detailed in Part
III, Chapter II of the Draft Articles.89 As noted in the commentaries, countermeasures “may have
a coercive character, but as is made clear in Article 49, their function is to induce a wrongdoing
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State to comply with obligations of cessation and reparation towards the state taking the
countermeasures.”90 This definition justifies reparations as an exception to the prohibition on use
of countermeasures. “in response to an internationally wrongful act that has ceased and is
unlikely to be repeated.”91 Even if the cyber operation itself has ceased, if the offending state has
not taken action to make amends and to be fully compliant with international law (e.g.,
prosecuting those responsible for the operation per the Budapest Convention), then
countermeasures seeking such reparations might be allowed.92
A lighter response to malicious cyber operations would be “retorsions,” which unlike
countermeasures, are not internationally wrongful acts themselves.93 These are political acts used
to apply pressure on an offending state, such as imposing sanctions or expelling diplomats.94 For
example, in 2016 President Obama expelled 35 diplomats in response to Russia’s meddling in
U.S. elections.95 However, many have voiced doubts as to the effectiveness of these actions.96
One example showing the ineffectiveness of retorsions, as compared to domestic
measures, is the recent news of Sudan offering reparations to the victims of the U.S.S. Cole
bombing.97 The attack was carried out by Al-Qaida militants, allegedly with support from the
government of Sudan.98 After almost 20 years, Sudan has agreed to pay $30 million to the
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victims.99 Last year, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a judgment of $315 million
against Sudan under the terrorism exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.100
However, the case was reversed on a technicality—a required notice of the lawsuit was sent to
the wrong place—rather than on the merits.101 The court left the door open for a new suit, which
would have likely garnered the same severe judgment, if not more.102 Sudan was much better off
paying $30 million now instead of ten times as much a year from now.103 If this was a driving
factor in the decision, it means domestic civil measures accomplished in years what took two
decades with classic retorsions.
C. Domestic Polices of Rival States
Another reason the United States needs to strengthen its domestic legal apparatus against
cyberattacks is the ongoing development in the East of so-called “cyber sovereignty” policies.104
Both China and Russia have begun to assert absolute authority in their domestic cyber spheres.
As some have argued, one need only look at
the competing groups at the U.N.—the U.S.-led Group of Governmental Experts
and the Russia and China-supported Open-Ended Working Group—to identify the
key fault lines between those who argue for cybersecurity in order to undergird
the personal and economic freedom of their citizens and those who would use the
bugaboo of cyber threats to control their populations and shape their domestic
political environments.105
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Russia and China are among a group of states—whose membership includes many on the global
cyber naughty list (Cuba, Iran, North Korea)—which is promoting a U.N. resolution on
cybercrime that is intentionally vague.106 This alternative is being pushed despite the already
wide support for the Budapest Cybercrime Convention.107 None of the countries noted above are
signatories of the Budapest Convention.108 A draft treaty offered by Russia “would allow
countries to solidify their hold over information and communications technology within their
borders, enabling some countries to further restrict activities and speech on the internet, while
also stressing governments’ sovereignty in cybercrime investigations.”109
Contrary to the U.S. goal of an open and free internet,110 China and now Russia are
attempting to erect walls of cyber sovereignty around their domestic networks.111 Last year in
comments to the Chinese state-run World Internet Conference, President Xi Jinping wrote that
states must govern responsible internet use.112 While the “great firewall” of China has been
around for years, Russia has recently been strengthening its control over the domestic internet.113
On November 1st, 2019, Russia adopted a new law allowing the government to assert more
control over the domestic internet.114 In its shorthand, the “sovereign internet law” evokes the
same language which has been used by China for years as an excuse to censor web content.
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However, the Russian version of cyber sovereignty takes the concept to the next level, “banning
the use of private networks and proxy servers” and instead establishing a Russia-specific domain
name system (DNS), which “will in theory drive all internet traffic seeking to connect with
Russian websites through government-controlled entry points.”115 This will, in effect, create a
content valve between the Russian internet and the rest of the world, allowing the government to
disconnect the domestic web at will, to monitor all traffic, and to likely even screen content. It
will also make it more difficult to deal with cyber threats emanating from Russian territory.
In a recent speech at U.S. Cyber Command, General Counsel for the Department of
Defense Paul Ney laid out the threat posed by near-peer competitors and specifically addressed
the three most commonly cited cyber threats.116 First, he noted that the Strategic Support Force,
under the People’s Liberation Army or PLA, provides China the cyberwarfare capability to
establish information dominance.117 He also suggested Russia “consistently uses cyber
capabilities for what it calls ‘information confrontation’ during peacetime and war.”118 Finally,
Ney noted that cyber operations have become a cheap “form of gaining real power, especially for
impoverished adversaries like North Korea.”119 Even though these rival states are ones the U.S.
typically views as military adversaries, Ney argued the DOD’s policies must only be a part of a
greater government-wide effort to “promote stability in cyberspace and adherence to the rulesbased international order.”120 The response cannot be only a military one.
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The United States is one of the largest victims of cybercrime and malicious cyber
operations in the world.121 There is much at stake in the coming years. As Glenn Gerstell argued,
we must develop resources and resiliency against cyberattacks, “But our laws and government
structures are not where they need to be to facilitate that task and confront this rapidly mutating
threat.”122 By updating and expanding domestic laws and policies, the United States can
influence the international discussion by showing that cyber defense and an open internet are not
mutually exclusive. The U.S. must rally like-minded states against the growing movement
towards cyber lockdown and the employment of cybercrime as a political tool.
II.

EMPLOYING DOMESTIC MEASURES AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED CYBER OPERATIONS
Since an international consensus on cyber law is unlikely in the near future, the United

States must strengthen and more fiercely employ its domestic laws and policies in order to
provide deterrence against cyberattacks. This effort can be broken into two parts. First, new
measures must be adopted to support attribution efforts—identifying the individuals and
organizations responsible for specific attacks. Second is employing decentralized government
actions, primarily in the courts, to sanction or punish those involved.
A. Efforts to Support Attribution
Attribution has been a notoriously difficult problem, in part because it often deals in
classified information, but mostly because the organizations currently conducting attribution
analysis are government intelligence agencies.123 The government can only do and see so much,
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and the trail of a hacker can quickly fade into the data stream. We can start to address this
problem with policies that go wide, empowering private security entities to conduct traces at the
moment of attack and employing military assets throughout the web for passive monitoring.
i. Deputizing the Private Sector
Glenn Gerstell argued the government “will increasingly rely on the private sector to
achieve national security goals, and the private sector will increasingly bear some responsibilities
historically borne solely by the public sector.”124 He describes how the delineation of
responsibility between the public and private sectors used to be clear, but as technology has
changed, private entities have become more capable of both launching devastating cyberattacks
and defending against them.125 This sentiment is echoed in the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission’s report, though is a more restrained manner.126 The report includes a pillar to
“Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration with the Private Sector” and a recommendation that
“Congress should direct the executive branch to strengthen a public-private, integrated cyber
center in CISA [the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency].”127 Though the
Cyberspace Solarium report acknowledges that “in cyberspace the government is often not the
primary actor” and that the government “must support and enable the private sector,” it falls
short of providing private entities the authority for active defense.128 The report still imagines a
government-focused, even military-led effort, with the private sector participating as planners
and passive information sources.129 The U.S. government should do more to empower private
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security entities, specifically for the immense task of attribution and tracing. This is often
referred to as “hack back” authority.130
Recently, scholars such as Jonathan Reiber and Benjamin Bahney have argued
“Companies own, operate, and control the infrastructure of cyberspace, and they may be able to
sense threats, shut off adversaries’ access to their services, or manipulate their own infrastructure
to block an attack.”131 Efforts are still ongoing to encode this partnership into statute.132
Originally proposed in 2017 by Representative Tom Graves, and reintroduced by Graves and
Representative Josh Gottheimer in 2019, the yet unpassed Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act
(ACDC Act) seeks to provide certain exceptions to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act or CFAA).133 These exceptions would allow private entities to respond to
cyberattacks with countermeasures and not be held criminally liable (though still potentially
subject to civil liability). Under the ACDC Act, private entities may take actions to establish
attribution or place beacons, disrupt a continued attack, or monitor malicious cyber behavior.134
These permissions do not include causing damage to systems, recklessly causing physical injury
or financial loss, causing a threat to public safety, causing disruptions to internet connectivity, or
intentionally creating remote access to an intermediary’s computer.135 Additionally, under the
ACDC Act, the private organization must notify the FBI before initiating a response.136
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Perhaps most significant of the allowed countermeasures is beaconing. As noted by
Glenn Gerstell, “The ability to obfuscate one's tracks in the cyber domain presents obvious
challenges to our national security. Anonymity is the gateway drug to cyber maliciousness.”137
The ACDC Act allows private cyber security forces to hack back into an attacker’s system in
order to place a beacon, which can later be traced by law enforcement.138 Allowing private
entities to react in real time to cyberattacks, to trace and identify the sources, would help to solve
the enduring problem of attribution. As noted in the Cyber Solarium Commission’s report, “The
U.S. Government is currently not designed to act with speed and agility necessary to defend the
country in cyberspace.”139 It is questionable that the government will ever be agile or fast enough
to respond to the majority of cyberattacks. Nor would the federal government be inclined to
spend the massive amounts of money such efforts would require, just to protect random small
businesses.
As of 2019, 43% cyberattacks targeted small businesses, but only 14% of such businesses
reported being prepared to defend themselves. These attacks cost businesses an average of
$200,000.140 Providing private entities the limited authority to hack back for beaconing and
attribution analysis will no doubt help relieve some of these pressures. It may also provide
market opportunities for larger security companies such as Symantec or Norton to provide active
defense services to businesses which do not have their own cyber defense teams. As currently
written, the ACDC Act requires coordination with the FBI.141 It could be rewritten to reflect the
recommendation by the Cyberspace Solarium to establish a CISA cyber center. This could be an
137
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interagency operations floor where cyberattacks, big or small, from around the country, are
tracked. In the cyber ops center, the legislatively empowered private security entities do the
legwork and front the fiscal burden, but are coordinated by government agencies such as the FBI
and CISA. The operations floor could also seat one or more attorneys to provide real-time legal
advice on international law issues and domestic criminal law procedures. Interagency JOCs
(joint operations centers) have proven very successful in responding to terrorism or humanitarian
crises, why not to the cyber crisis?
Some have cautioned against allowing private entities to engage in the sort of
countermeasures usually reserved for states. Chris Cook has specifically argued against the
ACDC Act, suggesting that other countries may interpret the actions as U.S.-sanctioned and that
such actions could harm U.S. credibility because “[f]or years, the U.S. has pushed the idea that
unauthorized hacking is illegal, and should not be done.”142 However, Cook’s analysis is flawed.
Cook has argued that review by the FBI was only voluntary under the framework of the original
bill.143 However, both the original 2017 and updated 2019 version of the ACDC Act require the
private entity to notify the FBI and to wait for “a response from the FBI acknowledging receipt
of the notification prior to using the measure.”144 This notification requirement, and the
information the defenders are required to provide, is for FBI oversight.145 This implies direct
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coordination, if not concurrence by the FBI prior to any private entity launching
countermeasures.146 If the FBI saw an issue with the planned measure, they could intervene.147
Moreover, the recommendation here is a much more robust government role in private “hack
back.”148 The CISA ops center would be government-led, and any responses would be authorized
state actions, though executed by private entities. This would eliminate this ambiguity Cook
criticizes. Though the action would be taken by a private individual, it would be a statesanctioned countermeasure.
Additionally, Cook suggests that there is a lack of international consensus on the issue,
and that imputed state responsibility could open the U.S. up for retaliation.149 This is incorrect.
First and foremost, retaliation is illegal under international law.150 However, retorsions and
countermeasures by states have been accepted under international law for some time, though
significantly limited in scope.151 With coordination and concurrence by the FBI or CISA, these
active defense measures would be state-sanctioned countermeasures, legal and legitimate under
the circumstances. Moreover, it is unreasonable to argue that the attacking state, when facing
such legitimate countermeasures, would be allowed to respond with countermeasures of their
own. That would create an endless cycle of authorized counterattacks. No, a state that is
conducting or sanctioning a blatantly illegal cyberattack has no entitlement to respond to legal
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countermeasures.152 Regardless, the point of measures like the ACDC Act is not to create a cyber
wild west, but rather to deputize the private sector in a coordinated, whole-of-government fight
against cybercrime. To be certain, the bill should be rewritten, both to limit the scope of
authority to only beaconing and attribution tracing, but also to require government coordination,
if not concurrence, on any actions taken.
The federal government simply does not have the resources or bandwidth to respond to
every cyberattack, so coordination with, and employment of, private security apparatuses is a
reasonable solution to a growing problem. The bottom line is that if we never get past the
attribution wall, no action can be taken against the offenders.
ii. Defend Forward as a Cyber Monitoring Tool
Currently, the “Defend Forward” concept, first coined by the Department of Defense in
2018, focuses on offensive military action in cyberspace.153 As described by Paul Ney, “the
strategy envisions that our military cyber forces will be conducting operations in cyberspace to
disrupt and defeat malicious cyber activity that is harmful to U.S. national interests.”154 This
follows the general top-down, government and military-led approach to cyber policy embodied
by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s report. Indeed, the report even includes a pillar
dedicated to employing “the military instrument of power.”155 What seems to be lost in the din of
saber rattling are the ways “defend forward” can be used in a more passive manner. Military
cyber capabilities can be used to create a passive monitoring infrastructure in cyberspace—cyber
passive sonar, so to speak, rather than active targeting and collection.
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This idea is already incorporated into the DOD strategy as “positioning” activities.156
Similar to reactive beaconing, positioning seems to involve Cyber Command proactively placing
monitoring functions on the internet abroad, so that they can detect immediately when an attack
is incoming.157 As noted above, the United States’ legal position—as well as that of the U.K., the
Czech Republic, and others—is that passive cyber intrusions with little to no manifest effect
would not constitute a violation of sovereignty.158 This passive web would enable rapid
attribution, enabling follow on civil responses, rather than military actions that might provoke
retaliatory responses. This intelligence could also be used to prosecute non-state actors caught in
the dragnet, whereas international law only allows active countermeasures to be used against
another state which has violated an international obligation. There are certain to be some issues
revolving around classified information and political prerogative, but having passive cyber
monitoring in place puts our courts in a better position than they would be otherwise.
iii. Legal Support Agreements
As some scholars have noted, “the main challenge for effective investigation,
prosecution, and eventually extradition of proxies, is gathering sufficient evidence.”159 As
previously mentioned, the Budapest Convention requires states to investigate and prosecute
cybercrimes, as well as provide mutual assistance to other states.160 To this end, the U.S. has
been moving to bolster legal support regimes.
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One example is the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act), enacted
in 2018.161 This law provides two benefits to U.S. law enforcement in cyber cases. First, it
amends a portion of the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2713) so that internet
providers, when presented with a lawful warrant, must turn over data on U.S. users, even if that
data is being stored abroad.162 Secondly, the Act “amends multiple parts of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) . . . to allow providers to permit disclosures to certain
foreign governments—but only those that have struck executive agreements with the U.S.”163
This will enable the cross-sharing of information and allow U.S. investigators to pursue foreign
agents in allied territory.
This sort of bilateral or international coordination and support has been critical to
bringing hackers to justice in the past. One glowing example was the conviction in 2016 of
Vladimir Tsastin, an Estonian who infected more than four million computers with malware.164
Tsastin was extradited by Estonia to the United States, tried in the Southern District of New
York, and ultimately sentenced to eighty-seven months confinement.165 Without coordination
and mutual support between the United States, Estonia, and other countries, this case would have
never reached a successful conclusion.
First and foremost, the required assistance agreements must be established with as many
like-minded nations as possible. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission recommends
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streamlining legal assistance treaties and also increasing the number of FBI cyber attachés
abroad.166 Partnerships with allied states have proven effective;167 however, it is highly unlikely
that the agreements required by the CLOUD Act will be made with more adversarial states. Even
so, as long as the internet remains open, the U.S. will have potential access to data flowing
through the territory of friendly nations, which only increases the ability to head off “cyber
sovereignty” policies and to prosecute foreign cyber criminals.168 More can certainly be done to
support this effort.
B. Prosecuting Cyber Criminals
Once positive attribution is attained, and evidence is collected, the government should
take action. This can be accomplished through several mechanisms. First is with extraterritorial
application of domestic criminal law. As Egan pointed out in 2016, “Disrespecting another
state’s domestic laws can have serious legal and foreign policy consequences. As a legal matter,
such an action could result in the criminal prosecution and punishment of a state’s agents in the
United States or abroad.”169 Individuals, whether they are state agents or not, can be held
criminally liable as long as the right jurisdictional rules are in place.170 Second, law governing
international lawsuits, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, can be changed to allow
states to be held financially liable for cyberattacks.171 Such action can only be taken against state
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actors, though other measures such as private sanctions and the freezing of assets can be used
against non-state criminals.
i. Employing Domestic Criminal Law
The question of applying domestic law to cyberattacks perpetrated by foreign actors is
simplified when those actors are within the territory of the victim state. Much of the right of
states to enforce their domestic law against foreign residents and immigrants stems from general
principles of sovereignty.172 In the case of cyberspace, despite the inanimate nature of data,
information is still required to flow through physical infrastructure that is located within
sovereign territory.173 Even though the developers of the internet may have envisioned a free and
borderless digital world, that has not proven the case.174 Indeed, “the internet has been to some
extent Balkanized by security controls erected and maintained by states.”175 Prosecutors are able
to enforce domestic law not only against the agents operating within their borders, but also on
any data passing through.176
However, U.S. prosecutorial efforts have been hindered when the attack comes from
abroad. As Glenn Gerstell noted, responding to the cyber epidemic will require updating U.S.
domestic law.177 His statements were in line with the National Cyber Strategy published in 2018,
which stated that the current presidential administration intends to “work with the Congress to
update electronic surveillance and computer crime statutes to enhance law enforcement’s
172
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capabilities to . . . impose appropriate consequences upon malicious cyber actors.”178 The
administration is right to believe that computer crime statutes can be an effective defense against
malicious cyber operations.179 Applying them, however, can be difficult.
The fundamental barrier to employing domestic law is jurisdiction. Though required by
international law to take action against certain types of cybercrime, and clearly interested in
responding to the malicious actions of rival states such as China and Russia, the United States is
hindered by the complexity of international jurisdiction.180 The Lotus Case defined rules of
jurisdiction in a couple important ways.181 First, within its own territory a state may exercise
jurisdiction as it sees fit, providing such action does not violate international law or
obligations.182 Second, and more importantly, states may exercise jurisdiction abroad over an
offense when the effects of that offense occur in the territory of the state.183 The International
Court of Justice ruling states, “It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a state
from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts
which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of
international law.”184 Of course, as with domestic jurisdiction, this would not include anything
expressly prohibited by international law. Many types of cyber operations, such as hacking and
spying, are analogous to espionage. Despite being a state action that is largely sanctioned, or
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perhaps ignored, by international law, espionage is rigidly enforced by most states’ domestic
law.185
The U.S. courts have long supported a presumption against the extraterritoriality of U.S.
statutes.186 In United States v. Bowman, a 1922 case which dealt with a conspiracy to defraud a
corporation in which the United States was a stockholder, the Supreme Court reinforced the
premise where the lack of a clear statement by Congress that a statute applies extraterritorially
“will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard,” or demonstrate Congress’s intent that it
should not apply.187 However, Bowman provided an exception for statutes “enacted because of
the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated,”
noting that a strict domestic jurisdiction “would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of
the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the
high seas and in foreign countries as at home.”188
In 2010, the Supreme Court finally returned to the issue in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, which examined the extraterritorial effect of U.S. securities legislation, and the
court held that “when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none.”189 The Court established that statutes apply to conduct abroad when: (1) Congressional
intent is clear in the statute that it applies extraterritorially, or (2) there is a clear and significant
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domestic “focus” so as to apply the statute domestically.190 Morrison did not state whether the
rule applied to criminal law, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the matter in
United States v. Vilar, holding that "the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to criminal
statutes.”191 Though coming from a circuit court, this opinion has dominated thenceforth.
Bowman and Morrison together establish three ways to approach a case of cybercrime
perpetrated by a foreign person abroad. First, if the crime is directed at the United States
government, then the exception to Bowman, allowing the government to defend itself, may
apply.192 Second, if a criminal conduct is clearly domestic-focused, one can apply relevant
domestic statute under Morrison.193 Third, if Congress makes clear in the text of statute that the
statute applies extraterritorially, then the conduct at issue can be prosecuted accordingly.194
Prosecutors may argue extraterritoriality by showing “clear evidence of congressional
intent to apply a statute beyond our borders.”195 Congress added such clear intent to several fraud
statutes when it passed the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, amending the definition of “protected
computer” in 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or CFAA) to make clear that
this term includes computers outside of the United States so long as the illegal action affects
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“interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States,”196 and revising sections
of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (governing access device fraud) by applying it to persons “outside the
jurisdiction of the United States.”197 Congress has yet to give the same treatment to several other
commonly charged statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud).198
Nevertheless, federal prosecutors continue to charge foreign hackers with wire fraud.
Most recently, the Justice Department charged four members of the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) for several computer and conspiracy offences, including wire fraud, in relation to
the hacking of credit agency Equifax and the theft of personal data and trade secrets in 2017.199
To be clear, the hackers were not in the United States at the time of the crime, having accessed
the Equifax network via a Swiss server.200 Government prosecutors have accepted that wire fraud
cannot currently be charged extraterritorially.201 Rather, they have been arguing for several years
that the mere use of U.S. wires to commit a fraud scheme is sufficient to charge wire fraud as a
domestic offense.202 This has required some dexterous legal arguments.
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In cases such as United States v. Hussain, the government has argued that Section 1343’s
focus is solely the “misuse of the wires.”203 This case involved a British national, based in
Britain, who used electronic means such as email, press releases, and phone calls to falsely
inflate the finances of a company which was eventually bought out by Hewlett-Packard.204
Though the district court ultimately ruled in favor of the government—due mostly to the
precedent of the controlling appeals circuit—the opinion revealed what shaky ground such an
argument rests on.205 In his opinion, District Judge Charles Breyer acknowledged “there is little
precedent regarding how to assess whether § 1343 is properly applied domestically in a
particular instance” and that views “generally break into two camps: those emphasizing the wires
and those looking to the fraud.”206 Moreover, the opinion accepts that Hussain’s argument which
asserts that the wire fraud statute “concerns itself with the execution of the fraudulent scheme as
a whole,” has merit, but ultimately holds that “[u]nfortunately for him, however, the test is out of
step with Ninth Circuit case law concerning how the government may charge a Section 1343
violation.”207 It is not surprising, therefore, that Hussain appealed. The case is currently at the
Ninth Circuit, who seem to be free to overturn their previous support of the “focus is the wires”
argument.208
The focus on the use of wires is based on an enduring idea that the wire fraud statute was
meant to emulate the mail fraud statute, which itself focuses on “use of the mails itself, not on
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the underlying scheme or a particular fraud victim.”209 Of course, when the wire fraud statute
was first enacted in 1952, Congress was incapable of conceiving where digital technology would
end up six decades thence.210 Even telephone and television were underdeveloped technologies
at the time.211 In 1952, a person passing a communication via U.S. wires was very likely either in
the United States himself or connecting directly to someone in the country.212 The analogy to
mail is no longer sustainable in the high-speed internet age. Those two means of communication
have become wildly dissimilar. While it is highly unlikely that a physical package shipped from
Russia to Brazil would pass though the United States today (it would probably be air mailed
directly to the destination), an internet communication between the same countries is likely to
bounce through the networks of several unrelated states before reaching its destination.213 Should
each of those states be allowed domestic jurisdiction over an offence, which does not affect their
citizens or interests, simply because the transmission passed through their networks?
Judge Breyer highlighted this conundrum best when he acknowledged:
The government’s proposed rule that § 1343 is properly applied domestically
whenever a wire is transmitted within the United States is in some tension with
Morrison’s insistence on the presumption against extraterritoriality, because it
would tend to allow the government to prosecute conduct with minimal domestic
connections. One can imagine, for instance, a global click-fraud scheme similar to
the one in Gasperini in which a defendant combines servers worldwide into a
“botnet” from which to launch an attack on an extraterritorial entity. So long as
one of the servers is in the United States, application of § 1343 would be
209
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proper. . . . but this result is dubious as a matter of statutory interpretation. The
drafters of § 1343 did not envision the statute applying to internationals bouncing
wires into and out of the United States, with no participation from any U.S.
resident, in order to defraud international entities. The government’s bright-line
rule thus appears to be problematically broad in application.214
In Hussain, even the government clearly accepts that its own interpretation is not solid.215 When
it introduces this argument in the appellate brief, it also notes, “even if [the statute’s] focus were
the scheme to defraud [as opposed to the use of U.S. wires], here the evidence easily sufficed for
a rational juror to find domestic wire fraud and conspiracy.”216 Some scholars have agreed that
the statute requires both the scheme to defraud and the use of wires to have a domestic focus in
order to charge as a domestic offense.217
One might ask, why would the government charge wire fraud if extraterritorial
prosecution under the CFAA is already supported by precedent? The DOJ’s Computer Crimes
Manual suggests “[p]rosecutors may also want to consider charges under the wire fraud statute”
because it carries “stiffer penalties” (up to 20 years confinement for wire fraud, versus 10 years
for single charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1030).218 Additionally, it may be easier to prove wire fraud
than computer crimes if the government’s argument in Hussain is successful. One would just
need to establish “a scheme to defraud another out of money”219 which at least partially passed
through U.S. wires, unlike Section 1030, which requires proving unauthorized access to a
protected computer.220
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Since the Department of Justice seems to be strongly in favor of charging wire fraud
whenever possible, and in light of the ambiguity as to when it can be charged as a domestic
offense, it would behoove Congress to update the statute. Limited extraterritoriality can be built
in to Section 1343, triggering when an electronic fraud perpetrated abroad nonetheless causes
harm to U.S. citizens or interests.221 This would be little different from the extraterritorial
application of Section 1030, and would put the current uncertainty faced by the courts to rest for
good.
Demonstrating the effectiveness of extraterritorial criminal statutes, the 2001 case of
United States v. Ivanov was the first to apply the new extraterritorial definitions in § 1029 and
§ 1030 added by the USA PATRIOT Act.222 This case involved a hacker to broke into the
computers of the Online Information Bureau, “then threatened OIB with the destruction of its
computer systems (including its merchant account database) and demanded approximately
$10,000 for his assistance in making those systems secure.”223 Most notably, Ivanov’s motion to
dismiss based on the fact “he was physically located in Russia when the offenses were
committed” was denied.224 Ultimately, he pled guilty and was sentenced to forty-eight months of
confinement and three years of supervised release.225
Moving forward, new laws written to deal with the cyber threat should contain an
extraterritorial clause or current laws should be amended to eliminate any ambiguity. There are
several criminal statutes that might benefit from the same revisional treatment given to 18 U.S.C.
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§ 1029 and § 1030.226 These include the wire fraud statute, as previously mentioned. It also
includes 18 U.S.C. § 2701, the Unlawful Access to Stored Communications Act, which focuses
on protecting email and voicemail from unauthorized access.227 As noted in the Computer
Crimes Manual, “At heart, Section 2701 protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
these communications stored by providers of electronic communication services pending the
ultimate delivery to their intended recipients.”228 This seems particularly applicable to the
Russian hacks of Democratic National Committee emails and subsequent delivery to WikiLeaks,
which posted the private communications on its public site.229 These are just the statutes
currently in effect; nothing is preventing Congress from passing completely new criminal
statutes with extraterritoriality built in, in order to address the rising cyber threat.
Of course, extraterritorial criminal indictments are far from a cyber panacea. More often
than not, it seems, foreign agents are charged and never brought to trial.230 Indeed, this has been
one of the key arguments against the idea.231 It is highly unlikely that China would ever extradite
their hackers.232 However, we should not ignore the effect that illuminating these networks will
have. Those who have been indicted are, for all intents and purposes, burned.233 Moreover, they
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face de facto sanctions, being unable to travel for fear of extradition by friendly states, or invest
in the global economy for fear of losing their assets.234 One might argue that the more the U.S.
pursues Chinese hackers in court, the more its own agents face the same risk. Yet, there is
nothing stopping China from publishing the names of spies and hackers it discovers regardless.
No courtroom is required, and this would burn those agents just as effectively as any criminal
indictment, preventing them from traveling internationally and limiting their freedom in other
ways for fear of their lives. But an honest indictment requires evidence of a crime, and in
providing such evidence, investigations and indictments generate legitimacy in a way that press
leaks in today’s age cannot.235 They also raise public awareness and send political signals abroad
as to what behavior in cyberspace is or is not acceptable.236 The latter should help to begin
developing international cyber norms.
ii. Increasing State Liability
One fundamental weakness with domestic criminal law, despite any potential
extraterritoriality, is that states cannot be held criminally liable, only individuals can.237 This also
means that the attribution of acts by individuals to states does nothing to enable the government
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to seek criminal penalties against the sponsors, only the agents.238 However, civil liability can
still be assessed against offending states in certain circumstances.
Limited state liability is supported by international law. The commentaries of Article 31
of the Draft Articles describe the requirement states have to provide reparation for internationally
wrongful acts.239 The commentary notes that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.”240 Of course, resetting from a massive data breach
would be impossible, so alternatively, the commentary provides for “[r]estitution in kind, or, if
this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind
would bear” and for “damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in
kind or payment in place of it.”241
Additionally, some international cases have suggested that a state could be held liable for
transboundary harms. Rebecca Crootof cites the 1941 Trail Smelter Case between the United
States and Canada, which centered on damages caused to an orchard in the United States by
pollutants from a smelter across the Canadian border.242 The case resulted in a ruling that “no
state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons therein.”243 The implication
here is that states are liable for transboundary harm caused by the state or proxies attributable to
the state.244 More specifically, Gordon Christenson argued that the Canadian Government's fault
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lied in its failure to “maintain a regime of control in the face of the duty recognized in the
compromis as grounded in international law,” and that such failure would “constitute an act of
omission attributable to the state.”245 States can be held liable when they fail to fulfill their
international obligations (i.e. omissions), such as the requirements of treaties and norms to
prevent or prosecute cybercrimes.
However, U.S. law has long protected states from civil liability through mechanisms such
as Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act or FSIA, which protects foreign states from liability with
some limited exceptions.246 These include the noncommercial tort exception, which allows an
individual sue a state for a tort which occurs wholly inside the United States.247 Recently, there
has been a resounding call to add a cyber exception to the Act.248
In August of 2019, a New York federal judge dismissed a civil lawsuit brought against
Russia by the Democratic National Committee (DNC), in relation to the hacking of the DNC’s
servers and the theft of internal emails.249 In its ruling, the court cited the “whole tort” rule as
making it impossible to sue Russia for the operation, despite evidence showing clear attribution,
“because the hackers were not in the United States.” 250 In several recent cases, such as the DNC
hack case, the courts have rejected FSIA hacking claims based on foreign attacks when the
whole of the tort could not be claimed to have occurred in the U.S. If the 2019 ruling stands, it
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opens a critical gap in relation to malicious cyber activity.251 All it would take for a state to avoid
liability—even for cyber operations fully planned and executed in the United States—is for the
operators to route their transmission through a foreign server and claim the whole tort rule is not
satisfied.
However, Congress has passed several exceptions to the FSIA over the years, hinting to
what can be done to establish cyber liability. In 1996 and 2016, Congress added exceptions
relating to terrorism which added to the law “a civil cause of action against foreign states for
injury or death occurring in the United States based on an act of international terrorism occurring
in the United States.”252 Many have argued that a similar exception should be enacted relating to
state-sponsored cyber operations resulting in torts.253
There are several reasons why state liability for cyber offenses could be useful. First, as
with criminal jurisdiction, it decentralizes the response. The State Department simply cannot
respond to every little state-sponsored cyber action, nor would they want to. Which leads to the
second benefit, removing the decision to take action from political hands. Leaving the
politically-interested executive branch as the sole authority to respond to attacks increases the
likelihood that no action will be taken. This is risk is clearly shown in the government’s
unwillingness to address Saudi Arabia’s role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.254 Movement towards
some sort of just resolution in that case only began after Congress passed a FSIA amendment,
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allowing victim families to pursue the issue in civil court.255 Lastly, financial judgments can be
effective. Kleiner and Wolosky suggest “the threat of judgments worth billions of dollars that
can be seized and then lost would be far more of a deterrent than the hollow threat of criminal
indictments against hackers who may never set foot in this country.”256 This is supported by
Sudan’s sudden change of tone in relation to the U.S.S. Cole bombings after being threatened
with heavy civil damages.257
Congress has already begin moving towards a FSIA cyber exception, in the form of the
Homeland and Cyber Threat Act or HACT Act.258 This bill was introduced in the House and
referred to committee in June of 2019, and has been generating a lot of momentum lately,
gaining nine new cosponsors in May of 2020.259 As urged by Kleiner and Wolosky, this Act
would amend the FSIA to add an exception for “Foreign state computer intrusions.”260
This bill is not without its problems, though. As noted recently by Chimène Keitner and
Allison Peters, “the categories of malicious cyber activity covered in this bill are so broad that
they would include activity that the United States itself intentionally and legitimately conducts
on a regular basis.”261 The types of covered activities under the HACT Act are borrowed from the
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CFAA (18 U.S.C. § 1030) and include simply accessing a computer without authorization.262
Another covered activity is providing “material support” to unauthorized access, which would
directly implicate the government if coordinated “hack back” is executed.263 These covered
activities are used as a justification to seek damages, so there is also a requirement that harm be
caused.264 However, the type of damages allowed under the Act are also too broad, including
personal injury, harm to reputation, and damage or loss of property.265 A private cyber security
firm might claim “harm to reputation” for the mere fact that a foreign agent breached their
firewall, even if they took no further harmful actions. The terrorism exception to the FSIA is
used to respond to terrorist acts that have manifest effects.266 Victims are killed or wounded, and
therefore deserve the right to seek compensation. Any cyber exception should also be tied to
specific manifest effects, such as physical damage, blackmail, or active identity theft.
Additionally, as noted by Keitner and Peters, “the HACT Act fails to include any standards for
who can authoritatively attribute the harmful activity to a particular foreign state.”267 It is critical
to establish standards and authorities for attribution, and this could be tied directly to the “hack
back” and “defend forward” coordination efforts suggested above. To put it bluntly, the HACT
Act requires a lot of polish before it can be a productive counter-cyber measure.
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Regarding increasing sovereign liability, especially the sort of punitive damages levied
against Sudan, some have argued it sets a “dangerous and counterproductive” precedent.268 Haim
Abraham argued that awarding massive punitive damages against states—for example, under the
terrorism exception to the FSIA—makes it more difficult for victims to actually receive the
compensation, and may even cause a financial crisis in the offending state, setting off ripples
through the global economy which could affect the United States itself.269 Abraham argues that
such judgements against states should be limited to compensatory damages, or to only those
costs reflective of the actual losses.270 This is arguably how the long-standing non-commercial
tort exception of the FSIA functions. Abraham’s argument is compelling, but moreover, like with
criminal sanctions, civil judgements against offending states serve to “name and shame,”
highlighting the bad behavior on the global stage.271 It’s more than just making the offending
states pay, literally. Limiting the scope of FSIA judgments to compensatory damages would
serve the same purpose while avoiding the risks Abraham highlights.
CONCLUSION
As scholars have recently noted, “daily cybercrime complaints have quadrupled during
[the COVID] crisis, as non-state actors look to exploit the pandemic for financial gain and
nation-states turn to cybercrime to collect valuable intelligence.”272 The proposals here are not
without their drawbacks. Many of these measures are currently being developed, but in a
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piecemeal manner. It would be more efficient to pursue them all as a unified package, one bill
encompassing “hack back” authority, interagency coordination, expanded criminal jurisdiction
and state liability. Passing measures one by one will most certainly create gaps and frictions
between them.
Ultimately, employing domestic measures to tackle international problems cannot be the
desired end state. Indeed, U.S. policy has been consistent over the past decade that international
law can and should address the growing cyber crisis.273 Brian Egan reiterated in 2016 that
“existing principles of international law form a cornerstone of the United States’ strategic
framework of international cyber stability during peacetime and during armed conflict.”274 The
Cyberspace Solarium Commission recommended creating an Assistant Secretary of State, in a
new Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies, “who will lead the U.S.
government effort to develop and reinforce international norms in cyberspace.”275 But if the past
decade and the failure of multiple international working groups to reach any consensus on
cyberattacks shows anything, it’s that the effort to define cyber norms is going to take years, if
not decades. Even the DOD still reviews the legality of cyber operations through analogy.
Currently, there are multiple cyber working groups which are headed in different directions.276
Therefore, international consensus seems a long way off. The United States should undoubtedly
continue to lead efforts to establish clear cyber norms, but other immediate action is required
now to address the growing epidemic of cybercrime.
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Some have suggested that “we may be witnessing the opening rounds of a struggle for the
legal soul of cyberspace.”277 It is quite common today to read a news report or even an academic
article suggesting the time has come for a cyber Geneva Convention, that the world needs a new
treaty to confront the reality of increasing cyberattacks.278 However, hoping for cyber issues to
be resolved though international law anytime soon seems more and more like a pipe dream. It is
unlikely that any sort of cyber treaty will be adopted by those to whom it would be most
applicable—the United States, China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, etc. Chinese and Russian
participation in the UN GGE process has shown an unwillingness to accede to western views,
and even an effort to drive the discussion in the opposite direction.279 No, a comprehensive cyber
treaty is not a likely solution.
Instead, the support of treaties like the Budapest Convention have revealed a “growing
recognition among states that cyberattacks must be stopped, and that the way to do so is through
vigorous law enforcement.”280 Therefore, the United States must expand, empower, and
decentralize domestic policy to take action against both state-sponsored cyber operations and
non-state cybercrime.281 Most importantly, the U.S. must respond quickly and definitively to
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cyberattacks. As Jack Goldsmith argued on Lawfare, past patterns of “vacillation in response to
very damaging cyber operations will not deter our adversaries; it will embolden them.”282
History has already shown that domestic law can be an effective tool in responding to
malicious cyber activity, such as in the conviction of Aleksey Ivanov, the first person charged
extraterritorially under changes to the CFAA.283 It is within Congress’s power to revise other
criminal statutes to include extraterritoriality, and to authorize private entities to support an
interagency effort to tackle the problem of attribution. When cyberattacks are attributed directly
to individuals, these criminal need to be prosecuted swiftly and aggressively. Extraterritorial
clauses in criminal statutes, such as the wire fraud statute, will provide prosecutors with greater
reach and judges with greater sentencing power. When an action is attributed to a rival
government, those states need to be named and held liable. Even when their agents are arrested
and prosecuted, there is little that can currently be done to the sponsoring state. To this end,
adding cyber exceptions to the FSIA or other civil provisions would allow states who sponsor
malicious cyber operations to be held accountable, if only in the pocketbook.
Clearly, more needs to be done in cyber defense and response.284 Every day that Congress
stalls and does not pass new, innovative legislation, is another step ahead for the hackers. The
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evolution of technology is accelerating and if stronger deterrence is not offered now, it might
prove too little, too late.
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